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Volume 11 SPRING 1963 Number 2
Neal Appointed Dean
On January 8, 1963, George Wells Beadle, President of
the University, announced the appointment of Phil C.
Neal as sixth Dean of the Law School.
Dean Neal was born in Chicago, in 1919, and grew up
in the western suburb of Oak Park. In 1940, he received
Dean Neal greets Ward J. Farnsworth, JD'58, as Walter T. Fisher,
'17, Assistant Dean James M. Ratcliffe, JD'50, look on.
the Bachelor of Arts degree, summa cum laude, from
Harvard University, and in 1943, the LL.B., magna cum
laude, from Harvard Law School. While in college he
was elected to Phi Beta Kappa and to the Presidency of
the Student Council. In Law School he became President
of the Harvard Law Review, an unusually happy asso­
ciation, since Miss Mary Cassidy, then secretary to the
Review, subsequently became Mrs. Neal.
Continued on page 2
A Glimpse of the Supreme
Court at Work
The Seventh Ernst Freund Lecture
By THE HONORABLE JOHN M. HARLAN
Associate Justice, The Supreme Court of the United States
Apart from the honor of being asked to deliver a paper
under a lectureship bearing the revered name of Ernst
Freund, there are two other reasons why I was especially
pleased to accept the invitation of the former Dean of this
Law School to address you. One is that this School num­
bers among its faculty or alumni not a few of our Court's
most distinguished Law Clerks of the past, and that the
School's annual Supreme Court Review, edited by Profes­
sor Kurland, ranks high among the annual critiques of
our Court's work. The other, and more personal, reason
is that your invitation brings me back to the city of my
Continued on page 4
At the dinner which preceded his Freund Lecture, Mr. Justice
Harlan talks with Professor Kenneth Davis, the Honorable Walter
V. Schaefer, JD'28, Justice of the Illinois Supreme Court and
Chairman of the Law School Visiting Committee, and Mrs. George
W. Beadle, wife of the President of the University.
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Upon graduation from Law School, Dean Neal served
for two years as law clerk to Mr. Justice Jackson, of the
United States Supreme Court. He then entered private
practice in San Francisco, and was associated with the
firm of Pillsbury, Madison, and Sutro when, in 1948, he
became Associate Professor of Law at Stanford Univer­
sity. He became a full professor in 1954, and continued to
teach at Stanford until his appointment as Professor of
Law at The University of Chicago Law School beginning
with the academic year 1961-62.
Dean Neal's principal fields of interest are Administra­
tive Law, Constitutional Law, and Anti-Trust Law.
In 1945, he served briefly with the State Department as
a member of the Secretariat which, under the auspices of
the International Conference of Jurists, drafted a proposed
plan for a new International Court of Justice. He was also
Dean Neal talks with Harold J. Green, JD'28, with Thomas R.
Mulroy, JD'28 visible in left background and Stanley A. Kaplan,
JD'33, at right.
Charles W. Boand, JD'33, Chairman of the Tenth Annual Alumni
Fund Campaign, greets the new Dean.
At the Alumni Reception for Dean Neal, left to right: Professor
Sheldon Tefft, George A. Ranney, Jr., University Trustee, Ray­
mond Goetz, JD'SO, Dean Neal, and Richard F. Watt, JD'42.
Dean Neal shown at the Reception in his honor, with, left to right,
Ward Farnsworth, JD'S8, Hon. John V. McCormick, JD'16, Hon.
Ulysses S. Schwartz, of the Visiting Committee, Jerome S. Weiss,
JD'30, President of the Alumni Association.
More of those present at the Reception, left to right: Richard B.
Hansen, JD'S7, Julian R. Hansen, JD'S2, Professor Dallin H.
Oaks, JD'S7, Dean Neal, and A. Daniel Feldman, JD'SS.
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Bernard Weisberg, JD'52, Marshall Patner, JD'56, and Jerome S.
Weiss, JD'30, President of the Alumni Association.
a member of the International Secretariat at the confer­
ence in San Francisco, in 1945, at which the United Na­
tions was established.
Currently, he is serving as executive secretary for the
Co-ordinating Committee for Multiple Litigation of the
United States District Courts. This Committee is con­
cerned with the co-ordination of 1,962 civil actions pend­
ing before thirty-three U.S. District Courts and arising
out of the electrical equipment price-fixing cases.
Mr. Neal was also selected to write the fifth volume of
the History of the United States Supreme Court; the
Congress has commissioned the History utilizing funds
from the Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise.
The Dean and Mrs. Neal have four sons: Richard C.,
15; Stephen C., 13; Timothy B., 9; and Andrew G., 3.
They live in the University community, at 4825 Wood­
lawn.
His distinguished predecessors were Joseph H. Beale,
who was Dean from 1902 until 1904; James Parker Hall,
1905-1928; Harry A. Bigelow, 1930-1940; Wilber G. Katz,
1940-1950; and Edward H. Levi, 1950-1963.
Mr. Neal chats with the Honorable Samuel B. Epstein, JD'15, as
Alumni President Weiss and J. Gordon Henry, Secretary of the
Alumni Association, confer in the background.
In announcing the appointment of the new Dean, Pres­
ident Beadle said: "Since its beginnings sixty years ago,
the Law School has brought together a rigorous profes­
sional education with the most thoughtful scholarly in­
quiry and the most imaginative research. Under Dean
Levi, this tradition has been greatly enriched. The Fac­
ulty has been enlarged, diversified, and strengthened, and
its research contributions widened. The student body has
grown within the limitations necessary for the Univer­
sity's standards of excellence. A magnificent law center
has been erected for the School. Closer relationships have
been established with the Bar and the Bench, which have
brought the American Bar Association headquarters to
the Midway, and actual courtroom deliberations to the
School.
Professor Neal takes over one of the nation's top-rank­
ing law schools. He has the wide-ranging intellectual
qualities, the credentials of scholarly and professional ex­
cellence and the capacity for leadership that will create
a record of new achievement for the Law School."
The Rieser Society
The Record is pleased to announce the formation of the
Rieser Society of The University of Chicago Law School.
The purpose of the Society is to encourage and facilitate
the exchange of views among those associated with the
Law School, members of other Faculties of the University,
and their students, on a wide variety of topics that have
a bearing on law or that impinge on the learning or work
of lawyers.
To this end, the Society at various times throughout the
year will meet to be addressed informally by and engage
in discussion with a member of some other department
of the University.
The membership of the Society consists of all members
of the Law School Faculty, students of the Law School
who will be selected by the Faculty and invited to attend
particular sessions thought to be of special interest to
them, and guests invited to participate in the sessions.
The Society has been named after the late Leonard
Rieser, a prominent Chicago attorney, who took a per­
sonal interest in the affairs of the Law School, and in the
education of law students. The formation and continued
operation of the Society was made possible through a
fund endowed by Mr. Rieser's family and friends.
At the first meeting of the society, in February, Arnold
Harberger, Professor of Economics at The University of
Chicago, discussed the tax cut and tax reform proposals
of the Administration. John P. Roche, Professor of Poli­
tics at Brandeis University, and Visiting Professor of Po­
litical Science at The University of Chicago, discussed
civil liberties in modern America at the Society's second
meeting, in April.
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birth, whose ways I like to think still course in my out­
look.
It is a favorite pastime among lawyers, as well as lay­
men, to speculate on whether the Supreme Court with
any change in membership is likely to become more "lib­
eral" or "conservative," words which as applied to the
judicial office I intensely dislike. What the Court decides
in great cases is, of course, the thing of ultimate impor­
tance. But since the character of the cases that reach the
Court for review and how they are decided once there are
products not only of the individual qualities of its mem­
bers but of the character of its deliberative processes as
well, it is important that the way in which the Court's
business is conducted should also be understood, particu­
larly, of course, by members of the Bar who expect to
practice there.
I therefore thought it appropriate before an audience
like this to discuss, as compendiously as time permits, the
manner in which the Court goes about its work, with
special emphasis, I hope, on certain things which even
well versed lawyers appear sometimes to overlook or
underestimate. I shall deal with the subject from three
standpoints-the intake of cases, the decision of cases, and
the work load of the Court.
I
The cornerstone of the operations of the Court is the
control it possesses over the amount and character of its
business. That control is found primarily in the statutory
certiorari system which in the main enables the Court to
select the cases brought before it for review. Another
aspect of that control is found in the Jurisdictional State­
ment procedure, a judge-made device through which the
Court is enabled to deal with some appeals, representing
that part of the Court's appellate jurisdiction that is oblig­
atory, without setting them for argument and thus to
cut down on the time necessary to dispose of cases as to
which the Court has no option of refusal.
Prior to 1925 the Court's appellate jurisdiction was
A portion of the capacity audience at the Seventh Ernst Freund Lecture in the Law School Auditorium
Vol. u. No.2 The University of Chicago Law School 5
obligatory to the extent of some 80 per cent of its appellate
business. That is, in most instances litigants had an abso­
lute right to invoke the Court's reviewing powers by writ
of error or appeal. The other 20 per cent of appellate cases
reached the Court only through the exercise of its discre­
tionary reviewing power, that is, by certiorari. By the
early nineteen-twenties this had resulted in the Court's
docket becoming clogged with a large backlog of cases, so
that it sometimes took as much as two years after a case
was filed for it to be heard and decided.
The Court, concerned about this state of affairs, formed
a committee, chaired by Mr. Justice Vandevanter, to
make remedial proposals to the Congress. This resulted
in an overhauling of the Court's appellate jurisdiction in
the Judiciary Act of 1925. That Act greatly broadened the
classes of cases which henceforth could be brought to the
Supreme Court only by certiorari, and conversely de­
creased the number of those that could still be brought
there for review as a matter of right. The consequence
has been that since the new system took hold the Court,
despite the great increase in federal litigation and state
federal-question cases, has been able to keep virtually
abreast of its business.
This is not the occasion for a detailed discussion of the
refinements, or mysteries if you please, of certiorari. But
there are several aspects of the system that it is appro­
priate to mention. The first is that the Supreme Court,
contrary to what many lawyers surprisingly enough still
seem to think, is not a oourt of general errors and appeals,
in the sense that most of the highest state courts are. That
is, the rights and wrongs of a particular case will not
alone assure its review by the Supreme Court. I recognize
that this statement may fairly be regarded as subject to
qualifications in some areas of the Court's business, but
this general concept of the Court's role still remains for
the most �art true.
Speaking broadly, there are three basic questions that a
lawyer who can only bring his case to the Court by cer­
tiorari should ask himself in gauging the chances of get­
ting it there: Does the case involve a substantial constitu­
tional issue? Does it present a question of law of general
importance, as distinguished from its importance only to
the particular litigants? Does it entail a conflict of deci­
sion on the same point of law among the federal Courts
of Appeals or other federal courts whose decisions are
immediately reviewable by the Supreme Court? While
there are many variables that affect these generalizations,
it is fair to say that a lawyer whose case falls in one of
these categories will more likely than not get it to the
Court.
The second thing that is worthy of mention is that
every petition for certiorari and Jurisdictional Statement
is voted on by each member of the Court. It is not true, as
I have heard it sometimes said, that these matters are
divided among the Justices for disposition or recom-
mendation. It requires the votes of four Justices, that is
a minority, to bring any case to the Court for plenary
consideration, the scales being tipped to that extent in
favor of full-scale review. This. is not a statutory or
formal rule requirement, but an unwritten custom which,
however, is strictly adhered to. The practice had its origin
in representations made to the Congress when the Court's
discretionary appellate jurisdiction was enlarged, in order
to assuage the fears of some who thought that the new
system might result in depriving worthy cases of Supreme
Court review. And the practice has been carried over to
the disposition of appeals on Jurisdictional Statements.
The short of the "rule of four," as it is called, is that a
minority of the Court can control the character of new
business, while it takes a majority of the Court, that is five
Justices, or of a quorum (not less than six) to dispose of a
case once taken.
The next thing that should be given an observation is
the Court's oft repeated statement that a denial of certio­
rari signifies nothing beyond the fact that there were not
as many as four Justices who deemed the case worthy of
review. This is, of course, literally so as far as preceden­
tial value is concerned, although seemingly not always
recognized by lawyers and some lower federal or state
courts. It is also true in the administration of the certio­
rari system, in that a point of law deemed "uncertworthy"
at one time may, in light of intervening circumstances, be
thought so at a later period.
Before passing to the next part of my subject, a word
should be said about a phase of the intake of cases that is
perhaps not as widely known about as it should be. This
is what we call our Miscellaneous Docket, consisting of
cases brought to the Court by indigent persons, mostly
those who have been convicted of crime in the state or
federal courts. These litigants, at the stage of petitioning
for certiorari or filing their appeals, are almost always
without lawyers. Their papers are filed in typewritten
form, and often in handwriting, and run all the way from
laboriously prepared legal documents to the most in­
formal statements of grievances. All of these applications
are processed through the Court and, as with the cases of
represented litigants, are voted on by each Justice. If a
case is taken for review, a lawyer is assigned by the
Court to represent the indigent litigants on the plenary
hearing. These lawyers serve without pay, but their
traveling expenses and the cost of the printing of records
and briefs are defrayed out of the fees paid by lawyers
upon admission to the Bar of the Supreme Court. The
willingness of lawyers to serve in these cases reflects great
credit on the Bar.
In recent years the Miscellaneous Docket has grown to
very sizable proportions. Those who keep abreast of the
Official United States Reports will be interested to ob­
serve how many of the leading criminal cases come from
this source.
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Mr. Justice Harlan renews acquaintance with Mrs. E. Blythe
Stason, E. Blythe Stason, Administrator of the American Bar
Foundation, and Professor Soia Mentschikoff.
Let me turn now to handling of cases after they have
been accepted for review.
II
The Court sits two weeks each month of the Term to
hear arguments. The other two weeks are devoted to
opinion writing. Fridays (except for the Friday falling
in the midst of the two weeks' recess) are Conference
days. On those days the cases argued during the week are
discussed and voted on, at least tentatively, and the cur­
rent grist of petitions for certiorari, Jurisidictional State­
ments, and motions are dispatched. The Conferences,
beginning promptly at 10.00 A.M. and lasting usually to at
least 5:00 P.M., except for a 12 :30 to 1:00 luncheon recess,
continue on Saturday or some day during the following
week if necessary to cover the agenda. Until the 1955
Term Conference Day was on Saturday. With the change
to Friday, extra argument sessions were added to com­
pensate for the loss of one day of arguments occasioned
by the new system.
Last Term also saw a change in the timing of the daily
argument sessions. Until then the Court had sat from
12:00 M. to 2:00 o'clock, and, following a half-hour
luncheon recess, again from 2 :30 to 4 :30. The present
sessions are now from 10:00 A.M. to 12:00 and from 12 :30
to 2:30, with the luncheon recess from 12:00 to 12:30.
The time allowed for oral argument is normally one
hour to each side, with one-half hour in the less compli­
cated cases, so-called Summary Calendar cases. In excep­
tional cirumstances more time is allotted. In the Colorado
River Water cases, for example, 16 hours, a full argument
week, were allowed for the original arguments at last
Term, and seven hours on reargument this Term.
This description of an argument week brings me to a
point that should be particularly emphasized in connec­
tion with the plenary consideration of cases. It is the
importance of oral argument. It has often seemed to me
that many lawyers appear to underestimate the signifi­
cance of that part of their job in our Court. They seem
to assume that since their briefs will be read anyway, the
oral argument is little but the relic of a bygone day, more
important to satisfying a client than of significance to the
outcome of their cases. I can assure you that this is a
greatly mistaken notion.
The reasons for this confident statement are found not
in tradition, nor in the tastes of particular Justices, but in
practical considerations. From the outline that has been
given of the argument work week, you will doubtless
have gathered that the time between the hearing of a
case and its discussion at the Friday Conference leaves
little time for study. A considerable amount of the work
on a complex case indeed takes place before its argument.
Even in less intricate cases the briefs are usually read
before the case is heard, at least to the extent that each
Justice has more than a casual acquaintance with each
case. The oral argument furnishes the occasion for com­
ing to grips with the issues that are likely to be controlling,
an opportunity which, if not initially grasped by counsel,
is usually quickly created for him by questions from the
Bench. A lawyer who is not prepared to take full advan­
tage of this golden opportunity is missing an important
milestone in the process of decision of his case. For if he is
able to enlist the favorable interest of even one member of
the Bench, his cause will have advocacy in the Conference
debate which the lawyer, who is content to rest on his
brief, is, in the nature of things, not so likely to have.
Although the Conference discussion by no means always
determines what the final outcome of a case will be, it is
certainly a very vital stage, for positions once taken in
Conference debate are not easily dislodged.
This brings me to the heart of the decisional process. At
the Conference each case is stated by the Chief Justice,
who, after expressing his own views as to what the deci­
sion should be, then calls on each Justice, in order of
seniority, for his viewpoint. In controversial cases this is
followed by general debate and then a vote is taken, this
time in inverse order of seniority. In some instances,
memoranda by individual Justices to support their views
of a case are circulated before or after the Conference.
This was the uniform practice, and still is, in the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals on every case. I wish it were
also the practice in the Supreme Court, but, because of
the quite different circumstances, this would hardly be
feasible.
After the Conference vote is taken it falls to the lot of
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the Chief Justice, if he is in the majority to assign the
case for the writing of an opinion, or if he is in the
minority that function falls to the senior member of the
majority. If decision of the case is by a divided vote, the
members of the minority usually agree among themselves
on one of their number to write the dissenting opinion,
unless the issues are so divisive as to call for multiple
dissents, such cases frequently also producing multiple
opinions on the majority side. All draft opinions are of
course circulated, and usually more than once, among all
members of the Court, and not until the last word has
been written is the decision announced in open court,
always on a Monday morning.
But the point I would especially emphasize is that the
books on voting are never closed until the decision actual­
ly comes down. Until then any member of the Court is
perfectly free to change his vote, and it is not an unheard­
of occurrence for a persuasive minority opinion to even­
tuate as the prevailing opinion. In short, decisions of the
Court are not the product of an institutional approach,
as with a professional decision of a law firm or policy
determination of a business enterprise. They are the result
merely of a tally of individual votes cast after the illu­
minating influences of collective debate. The rule of ulti­
mate individual responsibility is a respected and jealously
guarded tradition of the Court.
III
The final aspect of this paper is the work load of the
Court, a subject about which there has been much recent
discussion. The matter is not an easy one to get at, for
it is attended by many variables, but I shall venture some
general observations.
To begin with it can be said with assurance that the
annual statistics of the Court's operations are not alone a
solid yardstick of the work load. Indeed they are apt to
distort the picture. For example, in the three Terms
ending with the last, the total cases on the docket rose
from 2178 in 1959 to 2585 in 1961. These figures of course
include all cases offered but not taken for review. But it
would not be realistic to regard this increase in numbers
as reflecting a comparable drain upon judicial energy.
The reason is that, of these some 400 additional cases, all
but 15 were of the Miscellaneous, or in forma pauperis,
variety.
In the nature of things most of the Miscellaneous cases,
coming as they do from impoverished persons not repre­
sented by lawyers, do not present the volume of substan­
tial or even marginal legal questions as do those coming
from litigants acting under the constraints of economic
influences and legal advice. This means, in the first place,
that petitions for certiorari or appeals on the Miscel­
laneous Docket can generally be disposed of by the Court
with less, expenditure of time than those on the regular or
Appellate Docket. It also means that, of a given number
At the reception preceding the Freund Lecture, Robert Cushman,
Gerhard Jersild, JD'31, and Junius Allison, Executive Director of
the National Legal Aid and Defender Association.
of Miscellaneous cases, fewer will be taken for plenary
consideration than of the same volume of nonindigent
cases. Thus, in the last three Terms about 45 per cent of
the Miscellaneous cases, have been taken for plenary
hearing as against some 14 per cent of Appellate Docket
cases. The short of it is that the over-all figures alone are
not very revealing of recent trends in the volume of the
Court's work. Nor do I think that other purely statistical
approaches that appear from time to time are in them­
selves very significant.
A truer measure of things is the character of the cases
that the Court is called on to deal with in a particular
Term. An important controversial case inevitably leads to
divisions in the Court, which in turn add to the amount
of time-consuming opinion writing. A complex case, in­
volving a long record or difficult question of law, even
though not necessarily divisive, also naturally requires
more time than others to decide. And I think it fair to
say that the increasing number of both kinds of cases
accounts for the fact that the last three Terms have been
among the busiest in recent Court history. I think it
would be foolish to suppose that this is a temporary
phenomenon. It can hardly be anticipated that the period
ahead is likely to produce comparatively more equilib­
rium in the Court's affairs.
Where can we look for preventatives against the Court
becoming unduly overburdened? An increase in the
membership of the Court is certainly not the answer.
Unlike the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court sits en
bane in every case, whether at the intake or adjudication
stage. It should not be otherwise, even though a con­
trary course were deemed constitutionally permissible.
An increase in the Court's membership would thus
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Jerome F. Kutak, JD'28, is shown with Professor Kenneth Culp
Davis and Mrs. Davis.
simply add to the burdens of the decisional process. Chief
Justice Hughes put it well when he said some years ago:
"There would be more judges to hear, more judges to
confer, more judges to discuss, more judges to be con­
vinced and to decide." These factors, I believe, would
not be offset by the broadening of the manpower base for
opinion writing. Indeed, the contrary would more likely
be the case.
Nor does it seem to me that the answer lies in any of
the general proposals that have been made from time to
time to relieve the Court of some of its normal appellate
jurisdiction. I do believe, however, that substantial ave­
nues of relief could be found in eliminating at least some
facets of the Court's "direct" review jurisdiction, that is,
where a case does not first pass through intermediate
appellate review. The anachronistic requirement of direct
review in Government antitrust cases certainly affords
one prime example. From the standpoint of sparing the
Court the necessity of reviewing what in most of such
cases are essentially factual issues, involving the time-con­
suming task of reading often enormous records, as well as
assuring the parties more satisfactory appellate review, it
would be much better to leave primary appellate review
in such cases to the Courts of Appeals, with further review
by the Supreme Court subject to the process of certiorari,
There is also an opportunity for relief in one area of the
Court's self-imposed procedures. Until the 1929 Term it
was not unusual for the Court to carry over to the next
Term any unfinished opinions. Beginning with the 1929
Term it has been the practice of the Court not to rise for
the summer vacation until the opinions in all argued
cases have been handed down. It happens not infrequent­
ly that a case requiring a difficult opinion or multiple
opinions is not reached for argument until the closing
period of the Term. Under present procedures the alter­
native lies between doing the best one can with such
opinions within the pressures of reasonable adjournment
deadlines Dr setting the case for reargument at the next
Term, even though reargument would otherwise not be
deemed necessary. It is not difficult to understand why
any Justice confronted with that choice usually prefers to
stretch his energies, or perhaps even to cut corners at the
expense of solid professional work, in order to avoid the
necessity of imposing an otherwise unnecessary reargu­
ment upDn his Brethren and the litigants. The time may
come when this procedure will have to yield to exigencies
that call for recognition.
For the present and I believe at least the immediate
future, the Court can keep the management of its busi­
ness in good order by appropriate use of its certiorari
power. I have heard it said in recent months that the
Court has been taken an increasing volume of cases for
plenary consideration. This is not true, and indeed the
contrary is the fact, as the following percentages of grants
of certiorari for the past three Terms indicate.
Appellate Miscellaneous Combined
Term Docket Docket Dockets
1959 15.9% 6.9% 11.3%
1960 12.2% 2.5% 6.8%
1961 13.4% 3.4% 7.4%
In evaluating these percentage comparisons it should be
borne in mind that in each of these Terms the actual num­
bers of cases on the Appellate Docket have been relatively
stable, while those on the Miscellaneous Docket have
shown marked increase.*
I do not suggest by what has been said that there is not
room for further tightening up of certiorari standards.
And that will undoubtedly occur if the time arrives when
the Court's dockets reach seriously unmanageable pro­
portions,
There is another phase of the matter, on which I have
taken occasion to speak to lawyer groups in the past, but
without making much headway, I fear. The largest part
of the petitions for certiorari annually filed is, from the
standpoint of the legitimate business of the Court, com­
posed of quite insubstantial, if not indeed frivolous, cases.
This is mostly due to nothing more than unfamiliarity
with the nature of the Court's functions, and doubtless re­
flects the passing of anything that can really be regarded
as a Supreme Court Bar, in the sense of one composed of
lawyers having special familiarity with the ways of the
Court. Again, in terms of the statistics of the last three
;; Appellate Docket: 1959 Term, 1047; 1960 Term, 1046; 1961 Term,
1062.
Miscellaneous Docket: 1959 Term, 1119; 1960 Term, 1255; 1961
Term, 1510.
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Terms: Of the Government petitions for certiorari, all of
which must receive the approval of the Solicitor General
before they can be filed, between 60-70 per cent were
granted, as compared with some 14 per cent of the
Appellate Docket petitions involving private litigants.
Even with due allowance for the fact that the Solicitor
General does not practice under the same influences and
urges as a private lawyer, this does surely tend to show
that more "know-how" or circumspection on the part of
the Bar would substantially decrease the number of fil­
ings, with a consequent saving in the expenditure of
judicial time now devoted to' the examining of petitions.
The Miscellaneous Docket petitions, of course, present
quite different problems and, short of legal aid corning
into the picture at an earlier stage than it does now, it is
difficult to' see hO'W the numbers of such filings can be
appreciably checked or reduced.
Perhaps I am stargazing in adverting to the possibility
of a change for the better in this state of affairs, but before
an audience like this I thought it at least deserving of
mention.
Let me bring this paper to a close with a remark or two
about the present Term. It is proving to be a very busy
one, though again not fully revealed by the mere statistics.
The unexpected retirements of Justices Frankfurter and
Whittaker caused the carrying over for reargument at this
Term of some 16 cases, most of which would otherwise
have been put away with the last Term's business. This,
combined with the fact that a larger number of cases than
usual has been put on the Summary Docket, meaning
that a greater number of cases will be argued and decided
on the merits, is likely to result in more full-scale opinions
than in any Term of the recent past. I can assure you,
however, that the Court is in good vigor and spirit and
that YO'U, rather than we, are more likely to be victims of
this increased output!
Mr. Justice Harlan with Professor Davis at the conclusion of the Freund Lecture
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Alumni Dinner and Law Day
Celebration
The Annual Dinner and Law Day Celebration of the
Law Alumni Association was held on the eve of Law
Day, April 30, in the Guild Hall of the Ambassador
West.
The principal speakers were The Honorable A. Roden
Cutler, Australian Consul-General, New York, who
talked on "Australia, the United States, and the Common
Market," and Phil C. Neal, Dean of the Law School,
Laurence A. Carton, J.D.'47, First Vice-President of the
Association, presided. The Chairman of the Annual Din­
ner Committee was J. Gordon Henry, JD.'41. Mr. Carton
announced the election of Officers and Directors of the
Association, who are as follows:
Officers: JEROME s. WEISS, '30, Chicago
LAURENCE A. CARTON, '47,
Chicago
P. NEWfON TODHUNTER, '37,
Chicago
CHARLES W. BOAND, ' 33, Chicago
CHARLES F. Russ, JR., '51,
Chicago
J. GORDON HENRY, '41, Chicago









Directors (elected this April, to serve through April, 1965):
JEAN ALLARD, '53, Chicago
HON. JACOB M. BRAUDE, '20, Chicago
JOHN A. ECKLER, '39, Columbus, Ohio
L. JULIAN HARRIS, '24, Chicago
MARVIN GREEN, '50, Chicago
SIDNEY J. HESS, JR., '32, Chicago
KENT V. LUKINGBEAL, '42, New York
ROBERT McDOUGAL, JR., '29, Chicago
HERBERT PORTES, '36, Chicago
JOHN D. SCHWARTZ, '50, Chicago
LOUIS H. SILVER, '28, Chicago
EARL F. SIMMONS, '35, Chicago
EDWIN STRUGALA, '54, Chicago
DONALD J. YELLON, '48, Chicago
DUDLEY A. ZINKE, '42, San Francisco
Directors (elected April, 1962, to serve through April, 1964):
RONALD J. ARONBERG, '57, Chicago
STUART B. BRADLEY, '30, Chicago
J. L. Fox, JR., '47, Chicago
ANDREW C. HAMILTON, '28, Chicago
GEORGE C. HOFFMANN, '28, Springfield, Illinois
PAUL R. KITCH, '35, Wichita, Kansas
JAMES J. MCCLURE, JR., '49, Chicago
ABNER J. MIKVA, '51, Chicago
THOMAS L. NICHOLSON, '55, Chicago
KEITH I. PARSON, '37, Chicago
JOHN C. PRYOR, '10, Burlington, Iowa
HON. WILLIS W. RITTER, '24, Salt Lake City, Utah
FREDERICK SASS, JR., '32, Washington, D.C.
ARNOLD I. SHURE, '29, Chicago
BERNARD WEISBERG, '52, Chicago
The Munro Doctrines
During his stay at the Law School as a Visiting Professor,
SIR LESLIE MUNRO' delivered a series of three public lec­
tures. The topic of the first was "The Minority Position
of the Western Powers in the Enlarged General Assembly
of the United Nations, with Particular Reference to' Their
Financial Burdens." In the second lecture, Sir Leslie dis­
cussed "The Tendency of the United States and Certain
European States to' Work Through NATO and Like
Organizations Rather Than Through the United Na­
tions." The final lecture was devoted to' "The Interna­
tional Commission of Jurists-Its Present and Future
Functions." That lecture appears elsewhere in this issue
of the Record.
During the current academic year, the Faculty has also
been enriched by the presence of JEAN-JACQUES C. A. REY,
of the University of Brussels; XAVIER BLANC-JQUVAN, of
the University of Aix-Marseille, Aix-en-Provence; J.
DUNCAN M. DERRETT, Reader in Hindu Law at the
SchQQI of Oriental and African Studies, the University
of London; and WILLIAM TWINING, Faculty of Law,
University College, Dar es Salaam, Tanganyika.
Sir Leslie Munro, delivering the second lecture in his series
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Notes from the Law Library
Three gifts of more than usual interest have been made
to the Law Library in recent months. The firm of Win­
ston, Strawn, Smith and Patterson has contributed bound
volumes of the printed records in the receivership and
reorganization proceedings of seventeen railroads. This
gift, which was arranged by BRYCE HAMILTON, JD'28,
will form the nucleus of an outstanding collection of this
type of material to be established in the Law Library. At
the suggestion of Mr. Hamilton a number of railroads
have been contacted with a request that they add to the
collection. Two companies have already responded and
made additions to the collection, and answers have been
received from others indicating a willingness to cooperate
in this project.
HERBERT DEYoUNG, JD'28, gave to the Law Library
a part of the library of his father, Frederic R. DeYoung,
who was a Justice of the Supreme Court of Illinois from
1924 until his death in 1934. Among the more important
items were sets of the Illinois Supreme Court Reports and
the Harvard Law Review, which Mr. Herbert DeYoung
has arranged to bring up to date.
The firm of Gardner, Carton, Douglas and Chilgren
has contributed 190 volumes covering the laws of Argen­
tina, Brazil, and Uruguay. This forms an important addi­
tion to the Law Library's Latin American collection.
The Library Committee of the Law Alumni Associa­
tion, under the chairmanship of ARNOLD I. SHURE, JD'29,
is actively developing new sources of support for the Law
Library. The Committee is concerned both with raising
funds for the purchase of books, and stimulating the kind
of direct gifts of books described above. The Committee
has poin.ted out that some gift books may be actual addi­
tions to the collection. Others, while duplicates, may be
held in reserve to. replace existing sets worn out by re-
Leon Liddell, Professor of Law and Law Librarian, examines a
display of materials representative of those added to the Law
Library through the Frieda and Arnold Shure Research Fund.
peated usage. This is particularly true of reports. Even in
the event that books are useful for neither of these pur­
poses, they may be used in trades with other libraries to
acquire important additions to the library collection.
RICHARD LEVINE, who was a member of the Law
Library staff for five years, resigned April 1, 1963 as Cir­
culation Librarian to become Librarian of the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in New York City.
JOHN IGLAR, who was formerly at the Northwestern
University Law Library and the Chicago Medical School
Library, has become Circulation Librarian.
Supreme Court Clerkships
Two members of the Class of 1963 will serve as law clerks
to Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States.
LEE B. McTuRNAN will be clerk to Mr. Justice Arthur
Goldberg. Mr. McTurnan is a native of Bloomington,
Illinois. He received the B.A. degree from Harvard Col­
lege in 1959 and entered the Law School in the autumn
of that year. At the end of his first year at the School, he
was awarded a Rotary International Fellowship, which
enabled him to spend a year as a law student at Lincoln
College, in Oxford University. Mr. McTurnan then re­
turned to the Law School, and completed his work for
the Doctor of Law degree in June, 1963. During the
academic year 1962-1963, he served as Editor-in-Chief
of the University of Chicago Law Review.
Mr. Justice Byron White has appointed REX E. LEE as
his law clerk for 1963--1964. Mr. Lee, a native of St. John's,
Arizona, attended Brigham Young University, from
which he received the Bachelor of Arts with high honors.
During his senior year in college, Mr. Lee was president
of the student body. Prior to graduation from college, he
spent some two and one-half years in Mexico as a mission­
ary for his church. He is a member of the Board of Edi­
tors of the University of Chicago Law Review. At the
most recent computation of grade averages, Mr. Lee stood
first in his graduating class.
Lee McTurnan Rex Lee
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The Honorable Elmer J. Schnackenberg, JD'12, Judge of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
People v. Crump
By THE HONORABLE ELMER J. SCHNACKENBERG, J.o.'12
Judge Schnackenberg, a judge of the United States Court of
Appeals, Seventh Circuit, since 1954, has been a member of the
Bar of the State of Illinois since 1912. He was in private practice
from 1912 to 1945, when he was elected a judge of the Circuit
Court of Cook County, where he sat for nine years until his ap­
pointment to the Federal bench. He served for a part of his
Circuit Court career in the Criminal Court of Cook County.
While Judge Schnackenberg was in private practice, he was also
a member of the Illinois House of Representatives, serving twenty­
four years in the Legislature. He was Speaker of the House from
1941 to 1944 and while in the Legislature he was one of the prin­
cipal sponsors of, and was most instrumental in the passage of,
the Illinois Indeterminate Sentence Law, which is still the law in
Illinois today.
As a judge of the United States Court of Appeals, Judge Schnack­
enberg hears many of the criminal appeals taken from the District
Courts of the Seventh Circuit; he sat upon two of the appeals
taken in the Crump case.
The unprecedented reason given by the Governor of Illi­
nois for his recent grant of executive clemency to con­
victed murderer Paul Crump left Illinois citizens with a
widespread feeling of insecurity for the safety of them­
selves and their families.
In two trials, juries had heard evidence that Crump led
four other men on March 20, 1953 to a Stock Yards plant
in Chicago where he had been theretofore employed and,
in the course of a payroll robbery, Crump shot and killed
Ted Zukowski, a guard.
Ted Zukowski was a married man, the father of four
children. Crump was the beneficiary of a public school
education, ending in the second year at Morgan Park
High School.
In both trials he was represented by unusually able
criminal counsel of his own choice. He was convicted
twice and his punishment was fixed in each instance by a
jury at death, although his codefendants were given lesser
penalties. This result at each trial was approved by a
different trial judge.
The death verdict at the second trial was approved by
the Supreme Court of Illinois, People v. Crump, 12 Ill. 2d
402 (1955), the United States Supreme Court denying
certiorari, 357 U.S. 906 (1958); by the United States Dis­
trict Court, the United States Court of Appeals, 7th Cir­
cuit (United States ex rei Crump v. Sain, Sheriff, 295
F.2d 699 (1961), and the United States Supreme Court
denied certiorari, 369 U.S. 830 (1962), followed by a
denial of rehearing, ibid. 882. In none of these courts of
review did any judge file a dissenting opinion.
His unsuccessful attempts to set aside his conviction
were based on his claim that unfair methods were used in
obtaining his corroborating confession.
We are not here concerned with any question as to a
governor's power to grant a pardon or commutation of a
sentence. Anglo-Saxon law has long recognized that the
sovereign possesses that power. Derived from that prece­
dent, the constitution of Illinois expressly bestows such
authority on the governor "subject to such regulations as
may be provided by law relative to the manner of apply­
ing therefor". § 14, Art. v, Const. Ill. 1870. However,
when the governor published his novel reason for exer­
cising this power in the circumstances of this case, he in­
vited thought and comment by the people.
The governor's announced reason for commuting
Crump's death sentence to 199 years "without parole"! is
that, during his incarceration in the Cook County jail
awaiting disposition of several years of post-conviction
judicial review instituted by Crump, he has been "re­
habilitated."
It will be noted that this executive action is not based
on the traditional ground of a belief in the innocence of a
prisoner, either arising from a miscarriage of justice or
1 No comment is made herein as to the words "without parole,"
because of the general assumption by members of the bar that no gov­
ernor can thereby prevent succeeding state officials from applying the
existing parole law from time to time to any person in the future subject
thereto. Approximately one month after Crump's sentence was commuted
to 199 years with "no parole," the Illinois Supreme Court in People
ex rel Kubala v. Kinney, et al., 25 Ill. 2d 491, ruled that a 1961 law,
making all prisoners eligible for parole in twenty years "regardless of the
length" of the sentence, was retroactive. The law thus applies to all
prisoners, whether sentenced before or after the effective date of the
statute.
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the discovery of new evidence favorable to the prisoner.
Instead, as the people learned from the press, while in
jail Crump became a regular reader of the Bible and evi­
denced such a change that it was concluded that he was
not the same man who pulled the trigger that produced
Ted Zukowski's death; in short, that he had become
rehabilitated since entering the jail.
The State of Illinois is firmly committed to the benefi­
cent policy that rehabilitation may be considered by its
parole board, established largely for giving effect to that
policy, when it decides how long a prisoner shall serve
within prison walls a penitentiary sentence imposed by
the judgment of a court. Necessarily, however, there is
implicit in any conviction imposing the death penalty a
forfeiture of any right to an opportunity for rehabilitation.
When the enormity, atrocity and heinousness of a de­
fendant's commission of murder rises to a point indicat­
ing that his continued existence will constitute a real
threat to the lives and safety of law-abiding people, then
society, as a matter of self-preservation, provides that the
death penalty may be imposed. In such a case as the pres­
ent, a robber by his premeditated, wanton destruction of a
fellow human being has, in the judgment of two juries of
his peers, placed himself beyond the right of rehabilita­
tion. So they condemned him to die.
If it were not so, every criminal sentenced to the death
penalty would artfully strive for executive clemency and,
the better the actor, the more his chances to escape that
punishment would be.
One awaiting death in a cell, no matter what he has done
to others which brought him to that dilemma, can find
people, even his keeper, who might state that he has been
rehabilitated. As to Crump, even the governor was con­
vinced of that fact, but the application of the rehabilita­
tion theory to one sentenced to death is a contradiction in
thought and terms. It actually amounts to a refusal to
apply the Illinois death penalty act.
The jurors, as the traditional representatives of the
people of the state, after considering the evidence heard in
open court, including Crump's confession, found him
guilty and, in fixing his punishment, weighed the future
risk to innocent persons should he ever be released into
contact with society. Two juries felt the risk to society
was too great and hence they chose the death penalty,
which undoubtedly was within their province. That ver­
dict still stands despite Crump's appeals to all available
Illinois and federal courts.
Here was an unbroken sequence of judicial actions,
strung out for several years by Crump's use of every law­
ful effort to avoid punishment, which settled once and
for all the legal correctness of his death sentence. The
courts thereby served notice on all who plan to kill for the
purpose of robbery that, when such a killer is convicted,
he may for the protection of society be considered beyond
rehabilitation and shall forfeit his life.
This action of the courts made every citizen and his
family feel safe in Illinois. They knew, of course, if they
thought about it, that the governor had an undoubted
right to pardon or reduce the sentence. But, no new evi­
dence favorable to Crump having appeared, no perjury or
fraud at his trial having been suggested, and his convic­
tion having withstood in every available court the attacks
of ingenious lawyers, they assumed that no irrelevant
event occurring after his conviction, such as his claimed
"rehabilitation," could be utilized to defeat the death pen­
alty law of Illinois.
Citizens might well repeat the query "Death, where is
thy sting?" if a murderer may escape that penalty by con­
vincing a governor that, after the lawful imposition
thereof, he has "become another man" or has been "re­
habilitated." One shudders at the thought that one con­
templating a ruthless killing might even confidently rely
on his own histrionic ability, if caught, convicted and sen­
tenced to death.
For then, at the end of the road would not be the pun­
ishment of death but the rainbow of rehabilitation.
Conference Program
In the Autumn Quarter, the School held a Conference on
the Uniform Commercial Code. This Conference was
designed to examine the Code from a point of view quite
different from that of most discussion to date. Instead of
the customary article-by-article approach, a group of lead­
ing scholars discussed some of the basic problems which
arise under all articles of the Code, and analyzed the
similarities and differences in the treatment of such prob­
lems, in the various articles, as well as the reasons for
those similarities or differences. The topics and speakers
were:
"Self-Help and other Remedies in the Uniform Com­
mercial Code," by John G. Fleming, Professor of Law,
University of California; Berkeley.
"The Floating Lien: A Road to Monopoly?" by Peter
F. Coogan, of Ropes and Gray; Boston.
"The Concept of Commercial Reasonableness and
Good Faith under the Code," by Alan Farnsworth, Pro­
fessor of Law, Columbia University.
"Cutting Off Claims of Ownership under the Code,"
by William D. Warren, Professor of Law, University of
California; Los Angeles.
"Cutting Off Defenses under the Code," by Grant Gil­
more, Townsend Professor of Law, Yale University.
Soia Mentschikoff, Professor of Law, The University
of Chicago Law School, and Associate Chief Reporter,
Uniform Commercial Code, presided, introduced the
topics and speakers, and moderated the discussion which
followed each paper.
A Conference on Church and State was held during
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the Winter Quarter, under the chairmanship of Profes­
sor Philip B. Kurland. It might interest readers of the
Record to note here Mr. Kurland's prospectus of the
Conference: "It is perhaps strange that in this democracy
the two great causes of domestic conflict currently derive
from differences in creed and color amDng its people. At
least these are the conflicts that are of deep concern both
to the oourts and to the public at this time. It is not strange
that the Law School of The University of Chicago should
undertake, as part of its Conference Program, t,o bring
together persons competent to shed light rather than heat
on the subject of the religious issues, first by an explora­
tion of the depth and breadth of the problem of church
and state in this country; second, by an examination of
the proper role of the courts and the constitution in the
resolution of some of the thornier legal problems that
have arisen and are likely to arise."
The morning session, entitled "The Problems of
Church and State in the United States," included the pres­
entation of "A Protestant View," by the Reverend Harold
Fey, Editor of The Christian Century, and "A Catholic
View," by William Gorman, of the Staff of the Center
for the Study of Democratic Institutions. Professor Harry
Kalven, Jr., presided.
"Some Vexing Constitutional Issues" was the subject
of the afternoon session, over which Professor Dallin H.
Oaks presided. The speakers and subjects were:
"Taxation and the First Amendment's Religion
Clauses," by Paul G. Kauper, Professor of Law, Univer­
sity of Michigan.
"Constitutional Problems of Utilizing a Religious Fac­
tor in Adoptions and Placements of Children," by Mon­
rad G. Paulsen, Professor of Law, Columbia University.
"Constitutionality of Public Aid to Parochial School
Education," by the Reverend Robert F. Drinan, S.J.,
Professor of Law and Dean, Boston College Law School.
"The Future of the Wall," by Robert Maynard Hutch­
ins, President, The Fund for the Republic.
Papers delivered at this Conference will be published
by The University of Chicago Press in September, 1963.
By the time this issue of the Record reaches its readers,
the Conference on the Control of Narcotic Addiction
will have taken place. The opening session will examine
the case for penal sanctions against addicts, discussing the
issues underlying the selection and use of penal and alter­
native controls of addiction. "A Prosecutor's View" will
be presented by the Honorable Carl J. Debaggio, Chief
Counsel, Bureau of Narcotics, U.S. Treasury Department.
John R. Silber, Professor of Philosophy at the University
of Texas, will speak on "A Philosopher's View." The
second session will present four perspectives on the pr,o­
file of addiction. The papers and speakers will be:
"Addicting Drugs and Human Chemistry: A Pharrna­
cological View of Addiction," by Maurice H. Seevers,
At the Luncheon Session of the Conference on the Uniform
Commercial Code, Professor Allison Dunham, of the Law Faculty,
left, and Peter F. Coogan, of Ropes and Gray, in Boston.
Left to right: William D. Warren, Professor of Law, University
of California at Los Angeles, Soia Mentschikoff, Professor of Law,
The University of Chicago Law Schaol, and Grant Gilmore, Wil­
liam K. Townsend Professor of Law, Yale Law School, all of
whom participated in the Conference on the Uniform Commer­
cial Code.
Between sessions of the Commercial Code Conference, David Mar­
shall Evans, Assistant Professor of Law at the University of Chi­
cago Law School, left, discusses doctrine (or possibly pipes) with
John G. Fleming, Professor of Law at the University of California
at Berkeley.
Vol. 11, No.2 The University of Chicago Law School 15
Alan Farnsworth, Professor of Law at Columbia, addressing the
Luncheon Session of the Conference on the Uniform Commercial
Code.
MD., Professor of Pharmacology, the University of
Michigan Medical School.
"Social Causes. and Costs: A Sociological View of Ad­
diction," by Edwin M. Schur, Assistant Professor of So­
ciology, Tufts University.
"Personality and Social Disorder: A Psychiatric View
of Addiction," by Lawrence Zelie Freedman, MD.,
Foundations' Fund Research Professor in Psychiatry,
The University of Chicago School of Medicine.
"Patterns of Legal Controls: A Legal View of Addic­
tion," by Herbert L. Packer, Professor of Law, Stanford
University.
The final segment of the Conference will be devoted
to the subject of "Jurisprudence," Research and Policy in
an Area of Social Crisis and Uncertainty." Harry W.
Jones, Professor of Law, The University of Chicago, and
Director of Research, American Bar Foundation, will
present an opening statement and lead a discussion of
what, in our present state of knowledge, should lawyers,
legislators, administrators, and scientists do to promote
rational and appropriate policies and practices in this
area.
Foreign Law Program Students in residence at the Law School
during 1962-63; left to right: Harold S. Russell, A.B., Yale Uni­
versity; David P. Earle III, A.B., Williams College; James A.
Donohoe, A.B., St. John's University; and Bruce D. Campbell,
A.B., Haverford College. All received the J.D. in 1962. Not shown
are Robert I. Starr, A.B., Northwestern University, and Norman
Vieira, A.B., Columbia University.
The International
Commission of Jurists
By SIR LESLIE KNOX MUNRO
Formerly Dean of the Faculty of Law at the University of Auck­
land; New Zealand Ambassador to the United States, New Zea­
land Representative to the United Nations Security Council, Presi­
dent of the Twelfth General Assembly of the United Nations;
Secretary-General of the International Commission of Jurists; Visit­
ing Professor of Law at The University of Chicago Law School,
1963.
I find, as Secretary-General of the International Commis­
sion of Jurists, a growing interest throughout the world
in its objectives and its work. I am satisfied that for a
long time to come there will be a need for such a body
to secure the observance of the Rule of Law.
Let me quote the aims and objectives of the Commis­
sion as set forth in its Statute:
The Commission is dedicated to the support and advancement
of those principles of justice which constitute the basis of the Rule
of Law. The Commission conceives that the establishment and
enforcement of a legal system which denies the fundamental rights
of the individual violate the Rule of Law.
The Commission will uphold the best traditions and the highest
ideals of the administration of justice and the supremacy of law
and, by mobilizing the jurists of the world in support of the Rule
of Law, will, inter alia, advance and fortify the independence of
the judiciary and the legal profession and promote fair trial for
all persons accused of crime.
The Commission will foster understanding of and respect for
the Rule of Law and give aid and encouragement to those peoples
to whom the Rule of Law is denied.
The Commission consists of jurists who are dedicated to its aims
and objectives and who in their persons provide wide geographic
representation of the legal profession of the free world. The Com­
mission includes 25 members, which number may be increased
to a maximum of 40.
I think that it may be properly said that the Jurists now
forming the Commission are representative judges and
lawyers from all parts of the non-Communist world.
Communist judges and lawyers are not associated with
the Commission for the simple reason that they are op­
posed to the Rule of Law as defined by the Commission.
The Commission normally functions through an Exec­
utive Committee which meets in Geneva where the head­
quarters of the Commission are, but from time to time
it has met in other countries.
The Secretary-General is responsible for the practical
work necessary for the realization of the aims and objec­
tives of the Commission and is empowered within the
general policy laid down by the Executive Committee to
take such action as may be necessary to this end.
In his report of the Commission's Congress in New
Delhi, Mr. Norman Marsh, one of my distinguished
predecessors and a well-known British authority on inter­
national and comparative law, has thus defined the Rule
of Law:
16 The Law School Record Vol. 11, No.2
The Rule of Law, as defined in this paper, may therefore be
characterized as: "The principles, institutions and procedures, not
always identical, but broadly similar, which the experience and
traditions of lawyers in different countries of the world, often
having themselves varying political structures and economic back­
grounds, have shown to be important to protect the individual
from arbitrary government and to enable him to enjoy the dignity
of man."
The Commission has evolved, in its ten years of op­
eration, a policy basically carried out in two ways:
a) the investigation of systematic and general violations of the
Rule of Law. This requires taking appropriate steps to expose
those violations to the world at large and taking such action
as may be necessary to rectify breaches of the Rule of Law;
b) the promotion and strengthening of the Rule of Law through­
out the world by making more precise its meaning, particularly
with reference to rapidly changing societies.
The Commission has been most successful in its inves­
tigations of systematic violations of human rights. In
carrying out this responsibility, aside from the publication
of articles, special reports and the issue of press statements,
the Commission has relied heavily in recent years on the
situations in countries requiring support of the Rule of
Law.
J t can be argued that the preservaton and promotion
of the Rule of Law is part of the daily life of the lawyer,
but this is all too frequently £orgotten by lawyers whose
main concern too often seems to be the increase of in­
come. For example, to have practicing lawyers devote
time to the studying of the importance of the independ­
ence of the Judiciary-a real and practical problem-ere­
quires great invocation on the part of the Commission
staff. This is quite remarkable in view of the fact that
today there are so many glaring examples of countries,
close at hand, where the Rule of Law is non-existent and
human suffering is appalling, where the efforts of lawyers
and other leading members. of the community could have
averted disaster. In spite of obstacles and the lassitude
from which so many of our colleagues suffer, the Com­
mission will continue to encourage its many associates
and friends to act more vigorously for the principles in
which it believes and which should be the daily concern
of all lawyers.
The Commission has three regular publications: the
Bulletin , Journal, and Newsletter. Each has its specific
purpose and advantages. The Bulletin, which will now
appear four times per year, is designed to permit the
Commission to offer frequent editorial comments on in­
stances in which the Rule of Law may be threatened or
strengthened. The articles are based on the usual pains­
taking research, but are generally short and without foot­
notes. The Bulletin generally consists of between fifty
and fifty-six pages. The Journal is in a sense more "aca­
demic" in appearance, is designed to contain longer ar­
ticles with extensive footnotes and is more exhaustive in
its presentation of positive steps taken to strengthen the
Rule of Law or to denounce violations of human rights.
The Journal appears twice a year and averages about 160
pages in length. The Newsletter is essentially a house
organ and comments on current Commission activities;
it includes a report on missions, texts of press statements,
changes in Commission membership, and similar mat­
ters. The Newsletter comes to eight or twelve pages and
appears whenever circumstances warrant it.
As mentioned above, it is intended that the Commis­
sion publish annually four numbers of the Bulletin, two
numbers of the Journal and such Newsletters as may be
considered necessary. Since October 1954, when the Com­
mission's publication programme was initiated, the Com­
mission has published fourteen Bulletins (five since Jan­
uary 1959), nine Journals (four since January 1959) and
thirteen Newsletters (eight since January 1959).
During the period January 1959 to October 1962, the
Commission has distributed a total of 1,134,961 individual
units of publications in all languages (1959: 276,330; 1960:
262,531; 1961: 257,642; 1962: 338,418).
I should emphasize that the 40 to 50,000 judges, law­
yers and teachers of Law who receive the Commission's
publications are to the best of my belief actively interested
in our work and its publications. They are on our mailing
list because they have asked to be put on the list.
Once every three or four years, the Commission has a
World Congress, which is always widely attended by
Jurists from all over the world. Thus, we have had Con­
gresses in Berlin, Athens, New Delhi, and last month in
Petropolis near Rio de Janeiro. The Congress at Athens
issued what is known as the Act of Athens, and that at
Delhi the Declaration of Delhi.
At Petropolis the Congress in what is known as the
Resolution of Rio de Janeiro reached these conclusions:
It considered that the protection of the individual from unlawful
or excessive interference by government is the foundation of the
Rule of Law; the Congress has observed with concern that the
rights of the individual were transpassed or ignored in many places
in the world and that in many cases this arises from the over­
reaching by the executive power unrestrained by an independent
judiciary. Accordingly the Congress having discussed appropriate
measures to remove improper and excessive encroachment by gov­
ernment on the rights of the individual in the field of executive
action,
NOW SOLEMNLY
adopts the conclusions annexed to this Resolution and reaffirms
the Act of Athens and the Declaration of Delhi assembled by
earlier world conferences; which again were sanctioned in the
Law of Lagos by the African Conference on the Rule of Law and
accordingly calls upon the International Commission of Jurists
to give its attention to the following matters which were in the
debates of this Congress:
1. The conditions in varying countries on the independence of
the judiciary, its security of tenure and its freedom from con­
trol direct or indirect by the executive;
2. The encouragement of the establishment of international
courts of human rights on a regional basis;
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3. The role of the profession of law in modern society having
regard to the conclusions of Committee III and in particular
to its preamble which enjoins: "In a changing and interde­
pendent world lawyers should give guidance and leadership
in the creation of new legal concepts, institutions and tech­
niques to enable man to meet the challenges and the dangers
of the times and to realize the aspirations of all people.
The lawyer today should not content himself only with the
conduct of his practice and the administration of justice. He
cannot remain a stranger to important developments in eco­
nomic and social affairs if he is to fulfil his vocation as a
lawyer; he should take an active part in the process of change.
He will do this by inspiring and promoting economic develop­
ment and social justice.
The conditions to be fulfilled and the steps to be taken
in order to enable the lawyer to play this role effectively were
dealt with to some extent in the Conclusions of the Fourth
Committee of the International Congress of Jurists, New
Delhi, India, 1959, and of the Third Committee of the African
Conference on the Rule of Law, Lagos Nigeria, 1961.
4. The improvement of legal education where it is needed so
that the teaching and the understanding of the Rule of Law
in the best traditions of the bench of the bar is inculcated
in those entering the profession of the law.
5. The continuance of its important work in investigating and
reporting.
There are no doubt varying interpretations of the Rule
of Law. Some would identify it with parliamentary de­
mocracy, in which there is an opposition and where the
principle is adopted of one man one vote. Thus, many
denied that the Rule of Law can exist in the single party
state.
The question is posed thus: "if a hypothetical one party
Afro-Asian state has a free bar, an independent judiciary,
a free press and no preventive detention, does not the
Rule of Law exist therein as much as it does so in France
today?" With the partial acceptance of Pakistan while it
was subject to martial law, those Asian states which have
adopted one party or military rule do not observe the Rule
of Law. I draw your attention to some observations made
by Mr. John J. McCloy:
Mr. (Patrick Gordon) Walker has pointed out the fatuity of our
belief that democracy and free elections will make friends and win
the world. Yet I have the feeling we should not accept too readily
the thought that the Asian may not be interested in developing
his individual freedoms. Do we not abandon too much to Com­
munism if we cease stressing the simple doctrine of freedom from
the oppression of the secret police and the concentration camp?
The Asian may be far less sensitive than a Briton to his rights as
an individual, but he understands them, or, let us say, recognizes
them. Certainly he would appreciate it if he were no longer subject
to arbitrary arrest or decapitation. There is something more funda­
mental here than an electoral system, and given a fair increase
in the Asian standard of living, the idea may as readily catch fire
in Asia as it did in an earlier day in Europe.
6. What the political form will be in this part of the world is
hard to say-it may be a welfare state presided over by an oligarchy
-it may well be something far less than parliamentary democracy,
as we know it. But constant emphasis on freedom from the police
call and slave labour is appealing even if the individual or his
whole country never heard of the Bill of Rights. This is a true
asset of the West and it is no illusion to continue to feel that all
men are attracted to it and better off for it.
There are discouraging manifestations in certain of the
new states in Africa of which a prime example is Ghana.
While there is a small opposition in the legislature of six,
there is no effective opposition. At the same time, there
is a preventive detention, whereby the President, Mr.
Nkrumah can put into jail for five years, and if he so
decides for a further period of five years any person of
whose conduct he disapproves. This Statute was validly
passed and the Courts in Ghana have held that a person
detained has no remedy in the Courts. There is no trial
and the only opportunity for regress is an application to
the President, who need give no reasons for his refusal
to release a detainee. The numbers detained have run
into hundreds. Of course, preventive detention is part of
the Law of many of the new countries. During the last
war, it was employed in this country and the United
States. The argument adduced in its favor is that in time
of war or where there is no war but a state of emergency,
the State should be empowered to act to preserve public
safety. I consider the classic case on preventive detention
in time of war to be Liversidge v. Anderson 1942 A.C.
206. In this decision, the House of Lords applied the sub­
jective principle and decided that where the Secretary of
State acting in good faith under a certain regulation
makes an order in which he recites that he has reasonable
cause to believe a person to be of hostile associations and
that by reason thereof it is necessary to exercise control
over him and directs that that person be detained, a Court
of Law cannot inquire whether in fact the Secretary of
State had reasonable grounds for his belief. I wish to
refer in particular to the observations Lord Macmillan
made:
In the first place, it is important to have in mind that the regu­
lation in question is a war measure. This is not to say that the
courts ought to adopt in wartime canons of construction different
from those which they follow in peace time. The fact that the
nation is at war is no justification for any relaxation of the vigi­
lance of the courts in seeing that the law is duly observed, espe­
cially in a matter so fundamental as the liberty of the subject­
rather the contrary. But in a time of emergency when the life
of the whole nation is at stake it may well be that a regulation
for the defence of the realm may quite properly have a meaning
which because of its drastic invasion of the liberty of the subject
the courts would be slow to attribute to a peace time measure.
The purpose of the regulation is to ensure public safety, and it
is right so to interpret emergency legislation as to promote rather
than to defeat its efficacy for the defence of the realm. That is in
accordance with a general rule applicable to the interpretation
of all statutes or statutory regulations in peace time as well as
in war time.
I should add that Lord Atkin strongly dissented. The
Commission is constantly inquiring into this question of
preventive detention and has protested strongly to Mr.
Nkrumah. One of the persons he detained was the Presi­
dent of the national section of the Commission in Ghana.
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I am happy to say that this gentleman has been released,
but the government of Ghana refused him permission to
attend the Congress at Petropolis.
There may be arguments that in time of war or ex­
treme emergency preventive detention is not incompatible
to the Rule of Law, but I believe that where the emer­
gency is created in effect by a state removing any opposi­
tion, preventive detention is wholly opposed to the Rule
of Law.
In this address I must direct myself to the future activi­
ties of the Commission.
This aspect was, of course, carefully considered at the
Congress meeting at Petropolis. I have given you the
terms of the Resolution of Rio.
Let me go briefly into some essentials. Weare living
in a changing society. When I say "we" of lawyers, I
would look at this juncture particularly at our brethren
in the underdeveloped and emerging countries in Asia,
Africa, and Latin America. These countries are subject
to enormous stresses, both internal and external. One has
only to look at India alone, with its enormous population,
its great poverty and its menace from its northern neigh­
bour.
The role of the lawyer in all such countries is of su­
preme importance. He is always in government. Many
lawyers are in the administrative agencies and tribunals.
Of course, they form the judiciary, the bar, the solicitor
branch of the profession. They function in most govern­
ment departments. They educate those who are to be­
come lawyers and judges.
The Commission must seek to encourage and when
necessary, to protect the lawyer in all his various activities.
The Commission's duty is to the layman as well as to
the lawyer and to help in the task of assisting the layman
in the labyrinth of administrative agencies and tribunals.
It must encourage lawyers in all countries to see that
there are certain minimum standards for the safeguard­
ing of the Rule of Law in the adoption of administrative
regulations and in their enforcement.
The Congress considered it desirable that States should
prepare and adopt international conventions providing a
right to appeal for individuals and interested groups be­
fore an international tribunal to guarantee, in exceptional
as well as in normal circumstances, the protection of
prescribed rights.
"It is considered to be necessary that at least in cases
involving Human Rights there should be an international
court to which final recourse might be had by an individ­
ual whose rights have been infringed or threatened. Such
an international tribunal would be a World Court of
Human Rights, its writ effective in any jurisdiction.
"The first step in this direction could be regional con­
ventions with optional clauses analogous to The European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms and the Inter-American Draft
Convention on Human Rights, and regional courts anal­
agous to the European Court of Human Rights. Close
liaison between such regional courts would have to be
established in order to develop a common body of j udi­
cial decisions."
The Congress and therefore the Commission believes
that "In a changing and interdependent world, lawyers
should give guidance and leadership in the creation of
new legal concepts, institutions and techniques to enable
man to meet the challenge and the dangers of the times
and to realize the aspirations of all people.
"The lawyer today should not content himself with the
conduct of his practice and the administration of justice.
He cannot remain a stranger to important developments
in economic and social affairs if he is to fulfil his vocation
as a lawyer: he should take an active part in the process
of change. He will do this by inspiring and promoting
economic development and social justice."
The Commission has a responsibility, as I believe, to
encourage legal education.
"For the legal profession to be able to perform its social
function satisfactorily, the teaching of law should lay
special emphasis on three points:
"1. reveal the processes through which low can evolve,
promoting orderly and significant changes in the social
and economic organization of society leading to improved
standards of living:
"2. stress the study of the principles, institutions and
proceedings that are related to the safeguarding and pro­
motion of the rights of individuals and groups:
"3. imbue students with the principles of the Rule of
Law, making them aware of its high significance, em­
phasizing the need of meeting the increasing demands of
social justice, and helping develop in the student the per­
sonal qualities required to uphold the noble ideals of the
profession and secure the effective enforcement of law in
the community."
"There are two interdependent factors: the content of
courses and teaching methods. What follows, is in no
sense a suggested complete curriculum for law students.
Obviously important subjects for the establishment of
the Rule of Law are those which stress the content of
human freedoms and the protection of the individual
from arbitrary action: constitutional and administrative
law, criminal law and international legal studies. The
importance of procedural safeguards for human rights
makes the study of procedural law indispensable. Stu­
dents must be instructed in general legal principles and
in reasoning on specific legal problems. All courses must
be taught with emphasis on their social, economic, polit­
ical and historical background.
"A reference should be made regularly to other legal
systems and comparisons drawn between them so as to
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allow a more precise evaluation of the merits and defects
of the students' own legal system.
"Law Schools should be an active forum for all matters
of legal interest and not merely function for the training
of law students. They should therefore organize discus­
sions of topics relating to legal reform which concern the
area served by them. They should provide refresher
courses in new developments of law."
The Board of Directors of the Law Student Association for 1962-
63, clockwise from left: T. Frank O'Rourke, A.B., C.C.N.Y.,
President, Autumn and Winter Quarters; Oliver S. Chappell, A.B.,
Brown University; Peter J. Mone, A.B., Bowdoin College; Thomas
A. Ross, A.B., St. Mary's College; Alan Orschel, A.B., Dartmouth
College; Charles Kleinbaum, S.B., University of Pennsylvania,
President, Spring Quarter; Richard Fine, S.B., University of Wis­
consin; James Rainey, S.B., University of Notre Dame: Gerald G.
Hester, A.B., Whittier College; William F. Steigman, A.B., Haver­
ford College; Richard Brown, A.B., Princeton University; and
Richard Casson, A.B., Colby College.
Shown on the bench of the Kirkland Courtroom after hearing
argument in two cases from the Court's regular calendar, left to
right: The Honorable Arthur J. Murphy, JD'22, the Honorable
Henry M. Burman, Presiding Justice, and the Honorable Robert
E. English, JD'33, all of the Illinois Appellate Court.
The 1962-63 Committee for the Hinton Moot Court Competition.
Seated, clockwise from left front: Richard L. Sigal, A.B., Yale
University, Chairman; Donald Segal, S.B., University of Wiscon­
sin, Vice-Chairman; Donald Elisburg, S.B., I.I.T., Vice-Chairman;
Henry W. Siegel, A.B., A.M., U.C.L.A., Secretary; Alexander
Allison, A.B., Amherst College; Dennis H. Kops, A.B., Harpur
College; Barry E. Fink, B.S.C., DePaul University; Ronald Cope,
A.B., University of Chicago; Gary Bengston, A.B., Southern Illi­
nois University; Robert Leone, A.B., DePaul University; Russell
M. Pelton, A.B., DePauw University; Gaar W. Steiner, A.B., Law­
rence College; and Daniel L. Rubin, S.B., University of Pennsyl­
vania. Standing, left to right: Stewart Diamond, A.B., University
of Chicago; Thomas Mansager, A.B., Wesleyan University; Paul
J. Wisner, S.B., Marquette University; and Charles R. Staley, A.B.,
Harvard University.
The Board of Editors of the University of Chicago Law Review
for 1962-63. Seated, clockwise from center front: Edwin B. Firm­
age, S.B., Brigham Young University; Rex Lee, A.B., Brigham
Young University; June M. Weisberger, A.B., Swarthmore Col­
lege; Bethilda Olson, A.B., Mills College; Maurice McSweeney,
B.S.C., DePaul University; Anthony Gilbert, A.B., Harvard Uni­
versity; John R. Wing, A.B., Yale University; Robert Miller, A.B.,
University of Chicago; Noel Kaplan, B.S.C., De Paul University;
James Marlas, A.B., Harvard University; William Kelley, A.B.,
Marquette University, Managing Editor; George Fletcher, A.B.,
University of California; and Burton Glazov, S.B., Northwestern
University. Standing, left to right: Paul J. Galanti, A.B., Bowdoin
College, Managing Editor; William T. Huyck, A.B., Dartmouth
College, Managing Editor; Lee McTurnan, A.B., Harvard Uni­
versity, Editor-in-Chief; George Liebmann, A.B., Dartmouth Col­
lege, Managing Editor; and William L. Velton, A.B., Amherst
College, Managing Editor.
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The Justices of the Supreme Court of Illinois, shortly after they heard argument in the Kirkland Courtroom of two cases from their regu­
lar calendar. Left to right: The Honorable Byron O. House, the Honorable Harry B. Hershey, [D'Ll , the Honorable Joseph E. Daly, the
Honorable Roy J. Solfisburg, Jr., Chief Justice, the Honorable Walter V. Schaefer, JD'28, the Honorable Ray 1. Klingbiel, and the Honor­
able Robert C. Underwood.
The Teaching Fellows for 1962-63, lejt to right: David J. D.
Davies, B.A. (Hons.), Oxford University; Barbara Lillywhite,
LL.B., University of London; Raymond I. Skilling, LL.B., Queen's
University of Belfast, J.D., University of Chicago; Michael Lester,
B.A., Oxford University; and Jean-Jacques C. A. Rey, Licentiate,
Docteur en Droit. Miss Lillywhite is Senior Teaching Fellow and
Instructor, Mr. Rey is Teaching Fellow and Instructor in the For­
eign Law Program, Messrs. Davies, Lester, and Skilling are Bige­
low Teaching Fellows and Instructors.
Reapportionment and
Judicial Responsibilities
A talk before the Legal Club of Chicago,
April 8, 1963
By PHIL C. NEAL
Professor of Law and Dean of The Law School
The question with which I should like to worry you for
a few minutes this evening is this: As lawyers and as
citizens (but not as Republicans or Democrats, city dwell­
ers or suburbanites) what are we to think of the role the
courts are playing or are trying to play in the reappor­
tionment of the state legislatures? Should we applaud or
should we deplore? May we accept it as a new and proper
phase in the fulfillment of the historic role of courts in
our system, or must we receive such benefits as it may
produce with misgivings if not with alarm? As to whether
it is useful or important for us to consider this question
I say nothing. I suggest only that it is an interesting
question.
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I hesitate to state the issue more precisely than I have
done because it is. the kind of problem which can hardly
be reduced to a narrow proposition and in the end calls
more for intuition than for analysis. It is possible, how­
ever, to frame the area of uncertainty by recalling some
competing social insights which wise and eloquent mas­
ters. in our field have given us. We might start, for ex­
ample, with Justice Frankfurter's admonition in Baker v.
Carr itself, in his dissenting opinion: "In a democratic
society like ours, relief must come through an aroused
popular conscience that sears the conscience of the people's
representatives." And alongside this we might put Judge
Learned Hand's similar declaration of belief, uttered in a
different but surely not irrelevant context:
"
... This much
I think I do know-that a society so riven that the spirit
of moderation is gone, no court can save; that a society
where that spirit flourishes, no court need save; that in a
society which evades its responsibility by thrusting upon
courts the nurture of that spirit, that spirit in the end
will perish."
Bu then on the other edge of the same field of vision
we must admit the possible force of Professor Freund's
gentle rejoinder to Judge Hand's proposition: "The
question is not whether courts can do everything but
whether they can do something." And although we may
doubt that Mr. Justice Holmes would have favored judi­
cial intervention in legislative apportionment, we must
bear in mind the possible relevance of his observation that
"the felt necessities of the time" have had much to do
with the course the law has taken, and that "The sub­
stance of the law at any given time pretty nearly corre­
sponds, so far as it goes, with what is then understood
to be convenient." Finally, I find at least somewhat ar­
resting the remark made to me by a distinguished lawyer
who has himself had more than a small role in the current
reapportionment controversy. Commenting on a piece of
mine which criticized the Supreme Court's position in
Baker u, Carr, he said: "Much of the academic world
seems to me to have far too little appreciation of the
depth and force of the currents on which the Court is
riding.... I am inclined to believe that many of the prob­
lems we now regard as conventional were once even more
baffling than these."
It is the depth and force of the currents, perhaps, that
give this particular question of judicial responsibility
whatever special importance and interest it may have.
How should a court respond to strong currents?
It will also help mark out the contours and dimensions
of our question, I think, to see just what the problem of
reapportionment is, leaving aside the question of the ap­
propriate means to achieve it. The inability to compel
representatives of thinly populated districts to surrender
their powers over state legislatures amounts to nothing
less than the breakdown of the existing foundations of
government. What it means is that the built-in mech-
anisms for adjusting the distribution of political power
have failed. If resort to judicial help is really necessary-'
if neither legislative act nor popular initiative nor consti­
tutional amendment nor constitutional convention is
possible because of the rural hold on key parts of the
machinery-then the existing constitution has failed. The
transfer of political power must be accomplished outside
the established processes. In short, the government must
be reconstituted.
The term "revolution" is too strongly associated with
violence to be appropriate here, I suppose, but it has other
implications that are relevant. We really have no word
for the peaceful substitution of a new frame of govern­
ment for an old, by procedures not provided for in the
old. In dealing with the southern states after the Civil
War we called it reconstruction. What was it when the
men of Philadelphia in 1789, departing from their man­
date, decided to substitute a new constitution for the
Articles of Confederation and when. that new constitu­
tion went into effect by the ratification process prescribed
in the document itself? Is it not that kind of transition
which the courts. are being asked to bridge in the current
reapportionment litigation?
I do not overlook the point that, as the case is. put, it
is the Federal Constitution which provides the continuity,
support and command. I mean only to stress the funda­
mental nature of the function which the courts are being
called upon to perform. Should they respond?
Certainly there are strong reasons on. the side of saying
they should not. Mention of two must suffice, though
there are others. The first is that there is no body of law
which points the way toward how a state legislature
should be reconstructed, and little likelihood that any
satisfactory body of law can emerge from the present liti­
gation. The often-asserted principle of "one man, one
vote" gives no recognition to the equally important prin­
ciple of adequate representation for minority interests,
furnishes no guidance on such crucial problems as the
size of the legislative body and the drawing of district
boundaries, and is capable of producing quite arbitrary
restrictions on the framing of state political processes. We
would not think of espousing it, for example, as the con­
trolling rule for determining representation in the United
Nations.
No other principles which a court might declare have
been suggested or seem likely to be. It is true that the
Supreme Court might find the problem easier for itself
than I have indicated. It might, for example, limit itself
to deciding that a state's representation scheme was "un­
fair,". and avoid the difficult question of what would be
a fair plan by remanding to the lower court with that
convenient directive, "for further proceedings not incon­
sistent with this opinion.'" But the problems will not seem
that simple to the lower courts.
And this brings me to a second reason against judicial
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attempts to deal with reapportionment. As a practical
matter, what can a court do?
It cannot, I assume, compel a legislature to enact, a
constitutional convention to propose, or the people to ini­
tiate a new plan of representation. Its choices seem lim­
ited to admonishing the existing legislature or arranging
for the election of a new one. Unless the threat of the
second is genuine, the first seems likely to be futile or to
produce only the mildest kind of self-correction. The ul­
timate power which the courts are necessarily invoking
(and have in some instances already exercised) is the
power to create a new legislature, not merely the power
to invalidate a law. So drastic an assertion of judicial su­
premacy would perhaps seem less offensive to democratic
principles if the judicial plan of reapportionment could
at least be submitted to ratification by the people, as would
a new plan of representation framed by, let us say, a
constitutional convention. But to condition a judicial de­
cree on popular approval would, of course, be offensive
to our notions of the independence of courts and the
integrity of the judicial function. Is there not a lesson,
perhaps, in this dilemma? Does it not suggest that there
may be more importance in the concept of separation of
powers than it is fashionable these days to believe?
Th{s issue of principle aside, courts concerned with the
vitality of the judicial function must give at least some
heed to the possibility that what they command may in
the end have to be enforced. I have not so far seen signs
of serious resistance to judicial orders in apportionment
cases, and I think we should hope there will be none. But
must we not recognize as a possibility that somewhere,
sometime, one of these cases may result in a contest for
control of a legislative chamber between a group of rep­
resentatives elected under federal court order and a group
elected under the laws of the state? Unlikely as that may
be, I think it is not irrelevant to consider whether in such
an event we would expect to see the proceedings dictated
by federal marshals armed with contempt citations, or
entrance to the statehouse controlled by federal soldiers
armed with bayonets. Judicial power is at its strongest
where it brings the force of the entire community behind
a judgment of individual right or individual wrong based
on recognizable legal principles which in turn have the
sanction of community ethics. It is at its weakest, surely,
when it seeks to resolve the conflicting interests of large
groups in the community by enforcing mass compliance
with a judgment not based on established legal rules or
a great moral principle. It is hard not to believe that if
judicial � _ -ver in apportionment cases were ever put to
the ultimate test it would end in judicial defeat.
So much for the negative side of the question. There is
of course another side, as I tried to indicate at the outset.
Perhaps the most appealing point to be made in favor of
judicial intervention in reapportionment, and I have no
doubt the consideration most influential with the Supreme
Court, was the argument of necessity. No matter how
difficult or novel the task, and despite some rather nebu­
lous risks or costs to the purity of the judicial function
(the argument implied), courts should act because all
other avenues were closed. Judicial action was necessary
to unlock the situation and release the pent-up democratic
energies which would then take over the process of re­
form. A second point which should now be made, I sup­
pose, is that it is difficult to argue with success. There
can be no doubt that the Supreme Court's decision in
Baker v. Carr has touched off a wave of activity and
brought about, or is in the process of bringing about,
legislative revision on a broad front. I do not think we
know how substantial this will turn out to be, but for the
moment there is certainly reason to believe that Baker v.
Carr will indeed prove to have shifted materially the
basis of power in our state legislatures.
It is about at this point that analysis must give way and
let intuition take over. How shall we appraise these argu­
ments in favor of judicial reapportionment and how shall
we weigh them against the vague and impalpable costs?
Whatever one says must rest largely on speculation. As
to the impossibility of reapportionment without judicial
help, my own speculation is that the obstacles to reform
were exaggerated. I am sceptical that a determined and
organized political majority can indefinitely be denied its
proper voice in the state legislature. In Illinois, of course,
the reapportionment of 1954 came about shortly after the
courts had rejected efforts to obtain judicial help. My
examination of the record in Baker v. Carr does not con­
vince me that the failure to reapportion in Tennessee
represented more than the rather easy rejection of desul­
tory efforts to obtain new legislation.
I suspect that in general the rural domination of state
legislatures has continued not in the face of the kind of
"aroused popular conscience" of which Justice Frank­
furter spoke, but in the face of the same sort of apathy
that permits corrupt machines to dominate city politics
and inefficiency to dominate the administration of govern­
ment. Indeed, it is possible to read the success of Baker v.
Carr as confirmation of this point of view. To the extent
that reapportionment has already occurred, it is hard to
account for in terms of the coercive power of the courts,
although uncertainty about what that coercive power
might turn out to be has no doubt had some part in the
process. Is it not likely, however, that the most important
contribution of Baker v. Carr has been its polemic force?
It has focused attention on the problem, brought into the
open a widespread consensus as to the need for reform,
and helped create a momentum for change which legis­
lators find hard to deny-in short, it has itself helped gen­
erate the "aroused popular conscience which sears the
conscience of the people's representatives."
In the end, perhaps, one's views of Baker V'. Carr must
turn on whether one believes that arousing the popular
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conscience is a proper responsibility of courts, independent
of their function of deciding cases. I may conclude by
echoing, with variations, same themes suggested earlier:
If the currents of reform are deep enough and strong
enough, a court need nat ride them but need only divert
them into their proper channel; but if a court chooses to
ride them, or perhaps to generate them, we must hope
that it will have vision to see that there may be rocks and
shoals ahead. We must also hope that by enjoying the
heady satisfactions of riding these currents the court is nat
encouraging the people to surrender their democratic
responsibilities to officials appointed far life.
Book Review
Workman in the Law: The Opinions of Judge Ulysses S.
Schwartz. 222 pp. Privately Printed. Preface by Justice
Walter V. Schaefer; Foreword by Judge Edwin A.
Robson.
Reviewed by STANLEY A. KAPLAN
Professor of Law, The University of Chicago Law School
The reuicu/ which follows appeared in The Decalogue Journal,
Volume 13, Number 1, September-October, 1962, and is reprinted
here with the gracious permission of that publication and of the
author.
As a gesture of honor to Judge Ulysses S. Schwartz of
the Illinois Appellate Court upan the occasion of his 75th
birthday, his opinions have been edited and compiled by
Louis A. Kahn and Edward R. Lev of the Chicago Bar,
and published by the judge's brothers. This compilation
is, however, no inconsequential presentation piece issued
by a "vanity press"; it is a volume which merits a place of
respect an the shelves of any library.
The mast immediate and obvious characteristic of
Judge Schwartz's opinions is their facility of expression
and felicity of allusion. Their literary grace makes them
genuinely pleasing to read. They tend to be written in
what Professor Llewellyn! has termed the "Grand Style"
of opinion writing, as contrasted with the "Formal Style";
in Llewellyn's terminology, this suggests no grandiose­
ness but means that the opinion places its legal problem
and the pertinent rules in proper perspective in the factual
situation and discusses the social and legal considerations
relevant to the decision and to the development of a use­
ful rule. Other attributes-of deeper significance than lit­
erary lustre-that characterize and pervade Judge
Schwartz's opinions are his concern with the effect of the
opinion upan the society, his focus upan the social utility
of the law, and his constant concern with improving the
manner of rendering justice. This concern is illustrated by
his many trenchant suggestians far revising rules or
statutes which he deems outmoded or unwise; it is par­
ticularly well epitomized by his opinion in Gray v. Gray,2
which has been praised and quoted at length in Delay in
the Courts, by Messrs. Zeisel, Kalven, and Buchholz, who
state that Judge Schwartz puts his paint "eloquently" and
"with special farce" in an opinion which is a "notable
judicial essay an the problem of court congestion and the
concentration of the trial bar."
Judge Schwartz's opinions indicate clearly his belief
that the judge should play an active and enlightened role
in the growth and development of the law, within the
interstitial area in which it is proper far a judge to "make
law." He recognizes that the judge does nat have full free­
dam of action, when he states:" "This is nat a matter in­
valving method or practice or those interstices of the law
where courts have latitude. A court is nat the forum to
consider the effect of the proposed new type of litigation
upan the marital status and mold its opinion ta farm a
public policy sa determined. Public opinion cannot be
consulted by a court nor can social investigators be en­
gaged ta inquire into such matters. We must adhere to
the mare traditional method of construction." He has a
decent respect far precedent, a good craftsman's under­
standing of it, and a willingness to deal openly with it;
but he is nat hobbled or paralyzed by it.
In Eich v. Perk Dog Food CO.,4 a case of first impres­
sian in Illinois, he upheld the right of privacy in an eru­
dite opinion examining the right of privacy in its legal,
social, and historical aspects. The Eick opinion states,
page 37, "But even if we grant defendants' paint of view
that the right of privacy has no foundation in ancient
common law, it does nat follow that we should deny
plaintiff's right to recavery. To deny relief because of
lack of precedent is to freeze the common law as of a par­
ticular date.... With changing times rigidity can often
mean injustice."
With similar flexibility and perspicacity, Judge
Schwartz held that the doctrine which denies indemnity
between tortfeasors is inapplicable where the liability of
one tortfeasor is primary and active and the ather sec­
ondary and passive." "The principle of no contributions
and no indemnity between all joint tortfeasors is mare a
rule of ethics than a principle of law. The law simply
closed its door to the inter se disputes of those wham it
considered to be bad men. This originated at a time when
torts were in the main such wrongs as slander, libel, and
assault and battery. Today, torts are mainly the incidents
of industry and transportation, To continue to apply the
rule to such cases as that before us would make the law no
jealous mistress, but a squeamish damsel, refusing to have
anything to do with a couple of respectable suitors because
her grandfather once told her they were joint tortfeasors."
That his participation in the development of the law is
conscious and sophisticated is indicated by such statements
as: "This is haw the doctrine emerges from the cases
which have considered it. That this is the common method
far the development of our law and represents its unique
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and constructive character is demonstrated in Introduc­
tion to Legal Reasoning, Levi (U. of Chi. Press, 1949) ."6
Despite his earnest desire to stimulate the improvement
of the law and the administration of justice, Judge
Schwartz's opinions exhibit the strong rein of judicial re­
straint. This is peculiarly manifest in his various opinions
on appeals involving various administrative activities,
ranging from discipline within the police force, to discre­
tionary zoning variations, to the issuance of liquor li­
censes. He tends strongly to defer to the administrative
judgment in the absence of egregious abuse.
On the question of the latitude which a court has in
statutory interpretation he commented: 7 "We consider it
our duty to give the statute a fair and reasonable meaning
and not, by a process of indirect attenuation, to repeal or
partially repeal it. The legislature, unlike the court, could
hear testimony pro and con and could, as a matter of
policy, determine whether the statute should be repealed,
qualified, or remain as it is. We have no such freedom in
determining the law."
This volume of opinions is divided into eight sections.
The first section is entitled "Admonition to Counsel"; this
title carries an unfortunate implication of officiousness, to
which neither the opinions themselves nor Judge
Schwartz's reputation for gracious treatment of counsel
would lend the slightest support. With few exceptions,
the material in the various sections could often be inter­
changed. One section which is genuinely discrete is that
devoted to "Society and the Policeman."
It does not include any headline cases involving extorted
confessions, brutality, false arrests, or the like, but it does
.
contain a number of opinions which carefully and con­
scientiously consider the relationship between the execu­
tive staff of the police department, the civil service com­
mission, and the courts. Judge Schwartz points out the
need for judicial restraint in this area, with especial refer­
ence to the imponderables which go into the making of
an executive decision and which are difficult of proof in
formal litigation. "Courts must move with great care and
caution before they set aside the acts of the executive
department of the government under any circumstances,
but especially in matters such as this.?" He comments
further that," "It is easy in such cases for courts to fall into
the error of assuming their function to be charistmatic
and to take on the character of super commission or super
chief of police. * * *
"Not a single case has come before us in recent years in
which it has been charged, much less proved, that politics
or bias motivated the administration of the civil service.
* * * The Civil Service Act therefore must not be permit­
ted to become a mantle for the corrupt and inefficient. If
the court is to substitute its judgment for the judgment of
the Civil Service Commission and of the Commissioner
of Police as to disciplinary action that should be taken,
it would in effect be substituting judicial discipline with-
out responsibility for executive discipline with responsi­
bility."
Judge Schwartz's opinions, like his conversation, mirror
his eager curiosity, his prodigious memory, and his wide­
ranging literary and philosophic interests. They are also
enlivened by flashes. of sprightliness and wit. He notes,
for example, that glib medical witnesses have "shattered
the aerial limits of verdicts in personal injury cases and
made hundreds of thousands grow where only thousands
grew before.t'" He recognizes the therapeutic effect of
petitions for rehearing which "are sometimes used to serve
a secondary purpose-to enable counsel to assuage the
digestive pains which follow defeat in a hard fought case
where stakes are high."!' He soliloquizes on the problems
of the slowness of justice and comments that "Hamlet
summarized the seven burdens of man and put the law's
delay fifth on his list. If the meter of his verse had per­
mitted, he would perhaps have put it firstP He quips
that "A psychological assault of upper-case artillery and a
barrage of emphases serve only to distract and becloud.Y'"
He describes demurrers, prior to the Practice Act, as
having come "to have an odious synonymity with delib­
erate delay.'?" In recognizing that opinions should be
strongly buttressed and should not be mere exercises in
language, he states, "Our conclusion should rest on stur­
dier basis than the fine art of drawing a desired meaning
from ambiguous phrases.Y'"
It is seldom that any judge's work is assembled, exam­
ined, and valued as a whole, much less a judge of an
intermediate state appellate tribunal. Usually, the work
of judges (other than a few of the justices of the United
States Supreme Court and such men as Learned Hand) is
considered in disparate units, piece by piece, opinion by
opinion. In this collection, we are not provided with all of
Judge Schwartz's opinions, nor are his opinions complete
or in chronological order. The opinions are rigorously
excerpted; although the editors have provided excellent
brief factual summaries at the beginning of each opinion,
the reader often feels that he is reading short essays on
varied subjects rather than judicial opinions. In passing, '
it is surprising to note from this volume how frequently
he has dealt with matters of first impression in Illinois.
The editors have enhanced the volume with careful anno­
tations. One cannot, however, readily determine from the
collection in this form whether there has been change,
modification, or growth over the years in Judge Schwartz's
philosophy or in his mastery of the opinion form. The
reader cannot easily determine from this collection wheth­
er Judge Schwartz is more effective in one field or in one
subject matter than in another, though it seems to me
that his opinions in corporate and commercial affairs are
especially trenchant and discerning. It is to be regretted
that this volume does not also contain some of the speeches
and occasional papers which he has prepared and deliv­
ered from time to time. For example, the short address
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which he made at the dedication of the courtroom of the
University of Chicago Law School in 1960 richly merited
preservation; it was a graceful little gem of a speech, wise
in its observations, rich in its scholarship, and warmly re­
spectful and sympathetic to the law.
It has been enlightening to read these opinions in con­
junction with Professor Llewellyn's recent volume, The
Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals, which ex­
amines in detail the craft and the techniques of appellate
judging. Llewellyn largely takes as his raw material cer­
tain random opinions of selected appellate benches, as
delivered at particular times; so an observer keen as Pro­
fessor Llewellyn, this volume of Judge Schwartz's would
be a veritable laboratory, in which, in concentrated form,
he could observe the judges craft as it is practiced by one
able exponent. This volume, I trust, may be the forerunner
of other or similar collections to facilitate the study of
such craftsmanship through the close and detailed obser­
vation of the work of individual judges. Studies in depth
of the opinions of individual judges promise genuine use­
fulness for observation of judicial craftsmanship and de­
velopment. From the point of view of watching changes
and growth in a judge's style, his technique and his view­
point, it would be preferable (for the purposes of this kind
of study if all of a judge's opinions were collected, put in
chronological order, and set forth in full.)
Judge Schwartz's judicial performance, as exemplified
in this volume, merits high commendation; collections of
a judge's opinions which will measure up to his high
standards will be very rare. His opinions are forthright,
clear, and gracefully stated. They proceed with logic and
cogency in stating their premises and in making explicit
their relation to precedent, without twisting it or avoiding
issues. They demonstrate practical and knowledgeable
grasp of their fact situations, and they exhibit wisdom and
understanding in their conclusions. They perform well
their function of making clear to the litigants. and to the
Bar the issues which concerned the court, the matters
which the court found helpful in dealing with these issues,
and the reasons which led the court to the conclusions
reached. This volume of Judge Schwartz's opinions is a
pleasing and valuable addition to legal literature.
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CONFERENCES, LECTURES, AND SPECIAL EVENTS, 1963-1964
Summer Quarter, 1963
AUG. 7-Joint Dinner Meeting of Members of the Conference of Chief Justices, the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, and the Faculty of the Law School.
AUG. 13-Law School Alumni Luncheon, on the occasion of the Annual Meeting of the American Bar Asso­
ciation. Speaker: THE HONORABLE ARCHIBALD Cox, Solicitor General of the United States.
Autumn Quarter, 1963
OCT. 2-Address to entering students by the HONORABLE HENRY J. FRIENDLY, Judge of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, and Member of the Law School Visiting Committee.
Nov. 9-Conference on Legal History.
Winter Quarter, 1964
Eighth Ernst Freund Lecture, by the RIGHT HONORABLE KENNETH DIPLOCK, Lord Justice of Appeal.
In addition to the items listed above, three more conferences and at least one additional public lecture are
currently being arranged.
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THE CONFERENCE ON NARCOTIC ADDICTION
Shown during the luncheon break at the Conference on the Con­
trol of Narcotic Addiction, left to right, Harald Solomon, Visiting
Professor of Law at the University of Chicago, Dr. Maurice H.
Seevers, Professor of Pharmacology at the University of Michigan
Medical School, Dean Markham, Executive Director of the Presi­
dent's Commission on Narcotic and Drug Abuse, and John R.
Silber, Professor of Philosophy, University of Texas.
At the Narcotics Conference: Edwin M. Schur, Assistant Professor
of Sociology, Tufts University, left, and James M. Ratcliffe, Assist­
ant Dean of the Law School.
Left to right, Professor Dallin Oaks, Herbert L. Packer, Professor
of Law at Stanford University, who spoke at the Narcotics Con­
ference, and Law School Professor Harry Kalven, Jr., who pre­
sided at the morning session of the Conference.
Professor Walter J. Blum, left, Chairman of the Conference Com­
mittee of the Law Faculty, with Dr. Lawrence Z. Freedman, Foun­
dations' Fund Research Professor of Psychiatry at the University
of Chicago School of Medicine, and a speaker at the Narcotics Con­
ference.
THE HINTON COMPETITION
Prior to the beginning of argument in the final round of the
Hinton Moot Court Competition, the winning team of Russell M.
Pelton, Jr., A.B., DePauw University, left, and Barry E. Fink,
B.S.C., De Paul University.
Runners-up in the Hinton Competition were Gary Bengston, S.B.,
Southern Illinois University, left, and Robert Leone, A.B., De Paul
University.
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